| Age of Anxiety
The old ideas won’t
work in the war on
terror Kevin
Mattson
The Good Fight
Peter Beinart
HarperCollins, $25.95
(cloth)
8 The
president’s popularity is in free fall. The bold unilateralism
of the Bush Doctrine seems dead. And the once triumphal neoconservatives
are now deeply divided between proponents of a grand unipolar
epoch and chastened supporters of “realistic Wilsonianism.”
Iraq has changed everything, and these extraordinary changes have
left the so-called liberal hawks—who hoped Democrats would
turn tougher on foreign policy by backing the Iraq war—standing
on the sidelines, scratching their heads.
In the run-up to
the Iraq war, most liberal hawks defended their
position by emphasizing the humanitarian claims
against Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. (Bush
wound up at this position, but only after the
weapons of mass destruction failed to
materialize.) Pointing to Kosovo, they argued
that Americans could use power abroad for good;
pointing to Rwanda, they argued that Americans
must. As liberal intellectuals, these hawks
apparently felt a special responsibility to
condemn their left flank’s softness on all
things military. Paul Berman led the charge in
his passionate book Terror and Liberalism (2003),
in which he attacked “the anti-imperialists of
the left, the left-wing isolationists, who could
not imagine any progressive role at all for the
United States.” Others came to similar
conclusions, including Michael Ignatieff, George
Packer (to a lesser extent), and some of the
essayists anthologized in Thomas Cushman’s A
Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for
War in Iraq.
Peter Beinart, the editor of The
New Republic from 1999 until earlier this
year, joined the ranks of the liberal hawks a bit
late but with a bang. In December 2004—right
after Kerry’s defeat and before the Iraq war
was quite the mess it is now—Beinart called for
an end to the “unity-at-all-costs ethos”
among the Democrats and attacked the filmmaker
Michael Moore and the anti-war organization
MoveOn.org as insufficiently opposed to the
threat of terror abroad.
Beinart
succeeded in provoking controversy and won a
sweet book advance to boot. Considering the
timeline—the book was published in May
2006—The Good Fight must have been written
hastily. It certainly reads that way. It combines
a potted story about postwar America that relies
heavily on previously published histories of the
period with commentary about the road to Iraq and
the 2004 election that reads like any issue of
The New Republic from that time (minus the
pro-war stance the magazine became known
for).
Beinart’s publisher might have
hoped that history would stand still, but
December 2004 is a different world from the
present. Though MoveOn is still active and vocal,
it would be hard to make the case today that its
position on the Iraq war threatens to tag the
Democrats as pacifistic and weak on terror.
Indeed, without having done anything much, the
Democrats are now perceived as being much
stronger on the national-defense questions that
strangled them in 2004.
These changed
circumstances register in the first pages of
Beinart’s introduction. It is odd to hear
someone saying, Trust my political judgment
because I’ve made bad mistakes in the past. But that’s
precisely the tone. Beinart explains that he
supported the war in Iraq because he
“considered it the only remaining way to
prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining a nuclear
bomb” and because it “could produce a decent,
pluralistic Iraqi regime, which might help open a
democratic third way in the Middle East.” That
was then, and this is Beinart now: “I was
wrong.” He explains that he “could not
imagine that the Bush administration would so
utterly fail to plan for the war’s aftermath”
and that he “overestimated America’s
legitimacy.” Beinart concludes in his opening
pages that “it is a grim irony that this
book’s central argument” about the need for
national humility in guiding American foreign
policy “is one that I myself ignored when it
was needed most.” Nice to hear such a chastened
attitude, but it is certainly a strange prelude
for his next round of political judgments.
Of
course, a book is much more than its opening
remarks. And even if the Democrats are now
polling well on national-security issues, they
won’t be taken seriously for long if they lack
a foreign policy suited to a conflict-ridden
world. What should that policy be? That is
Beinart’s question. Like other liberal hawks,
he answers it by comparing al Qaeda to the
totalitarian regimes of World War II and the Cold
War and by proposing to recuperate the Cold War
liberal tradition. Beinart claims that Iraq has
turned liberals against the war on terror, and he
proposes to get them back on the right side by
invoking a historical comparison to an age of
anxiety charged with seriousness and
tough-mindedness. Unfortunately for Beinart, the
historical analogy very quickly strains beyond
the breaking point.
In making his case that the
enemy of the past is similar to the enemy of
today, Beinart, following Berman, relies on
Sayyid Qutb, the “father of Salafist
totalitarianism” who was hanged by the Egyptian
government in 1966. Qutb’s writings took aim at
“soulless America”—where he studied between
1948 and 1951 (he left with a master’s degree
in education from the University of Northern
Colorado)—and championed the “purification”
of Islam to its most radical core. The ideology
influenced Osama bin Laden as well as Beinart’s
quintessential example of totalitarian rule, the
Taliban. In its rule over Afghanistan, Beinart
points out, the Taliban demanded complete loyalty
from all citizens and enforced this consensus
using secret agents. There was also a fervid
disgust with Western decadence and an ideological
polemic against liberal democracy.
To explain
Qutb’s followers, Beinart draws on Hannah
Arendt’s classical account of totalitarianism.
To Arendt, the professed ideologies of
regimes—fascism and communism during her
lifetime—mattered less than their shared
patterns of domination and rule. Stalin’s power
looked like Hitler’s even if their rhetoric
differed. Totalitarianism, then, is an expansive
category, and it is easy to understand the
temptation to extend it to Osama bin Laden and
the Taliban as well.
So I reread Arendt’s The
Origins of Totalitarianism. There I encountered a
list that likely drew Beinart’s attention: the
“rule of terror,” the importance of the
secret police, the breaking down of individual
resistance. I ticked off each item. But then I
got to Arendt’s description of the
concentration camp. She spoke here of the “cold
and systematic destruction of human bodies,
calculated to destroy human dignity.” But
“cold and systematic”—is that really the
right way to explain jihad or the suicidal
violence that rewards its perpetrator with
virgins in heaven or even the creation of a pure
and virtuous Muslim population under Taliban
rule? The planes crashing into the Twin Towers
and religious martyrs blowing themselves up are
not the product of the grinding bureaucracy of
concentration camps or gulags. This is not Nazism
or Stalinist totalitarianism, in theory or in
practice.
Beinart’s effort to yoke the
Taliban and the totalitarianism of the Cold War
is understandable. It helps him de-emphasize
radical Islamic zealotry as the motivating factor
of terror and violence. It is a point that Berman
had already made in Terror and Liberalism: any
talk of a “clash of civilizations” is
dangerous since it places the United States in
the position of fighting Islam. Yoking radical
Islam with Western totalitarianism, as Berman and
Beinart do, allows one to evade a story of
civilizational conflict. But good motives do not
ensure effective analogies. And this analogy
needs to work if it is to generate the level of
anxiety that nurtures Beinart’s liberal
hawkism.
Cold War writers rightly understood
totalitarianism as distinctly modern and Western.
Fascism had arisen in Western Europe, after all,
and Marxist communism was a by-product of the
Enlightenment. This explains why totalitarian
ideas demanded serious attention. They held a
certain appeal for “Western man” living in a
new “age of anxiety,” as Arthur Schlesinger
put it in his 1949 classic The Vital
Center.
But who today believes that radical
Islam offers something to Western man living in
his current age of anxiety? Schlesinger knew
their numbers were small, but he reminded his
readers that the Soviet Union did have its
supporters—for example, within the ranks of
Henry Wallace’s Progressive Party. He could
also point to numerous memoirs of ex-communists
who explained why the ideology had appealed to
them. The I-was-once-a-communist books were
central to the forging of Cold War political
thought. Whittaker Chambers’s Witness, James
Wechsler’s The Age of Suspicion, the essays
gathered in The God That Failed—all had
different interpretations, but each included a
narrative about the author’s life that
explained the power and error of communist ideas.
So where are the books by the former adherents of
radical Islam? It is hard to imagine if John
Walker Lindh told his personal tale today that it
would matter.
More to the point, liberalism and
totalitarian communism both grew out of the same
intellectual traditions. The Right, in its talk
of “pinks” and “creeping socialism,”
played upon that relationship. And Henry
Wallace’s progressivism provided an opportunity
for the Right to point the finger. Where is the
analogy to today? Karl Rove might say that
liberals are weak on terror, but he doesn’t
suggest that the ideology of the Democratic
Party—whatever that might be—is itself
married to the Taliban or al Qaeda, or is a
logical extension of the ideas in Qutb’s
Al-’Adalah al-ijtima’iyah fi’l-Islam
(Social Justice in Islam). Schlesinger had to
spend a lot of intellectual energy distinguishing
his own brand of liberalism from Henry
Wallace’s progressivism precisely because his
own “responsible” liberalism was partly
defined by that distinction. That Marxist
communism was based on the Enlightenment
tradition is precisely what makes it different
from the radical Islam that Beinart would like to
put into communism’s place now. Beinart’s
hero, Reinhold Niebuhr, knew that a great deal of
intellectual attention had to be paid to the
similarities between Enlightenment-based
liberalism and Marxism. That was the basis of
Niebuhr’s theological reworking of liberalism,
his desire to move the doctrine away from its
Enlightenment roots and toward an acceptance of
human sinfulness and self-love.
Think of
Beinart’s primary enemies: his “softs” that
he wants to equate with Schlesinger’s
“softs” from The Vital Center. But Michael
Moore—who criticizes imperialism and the U.S.
government as an entertainer—is not Henry
Wallace, who was receiving advice from supporters
of the Soviet Union and in 1948 ran for president
(that campaign prompted Schlesinger to write The
Vital Center). When Moore opposed the Afghan war,
he was reflexively condemning American force
abroad, not saying that the he supported the
Taliban’s objectives or Osama bin Laden’s.
Beinart is right to criticize Moore’s lack of
seriousness, but he should have left things
there.
As for MoveOn, Beinart admits that
“there were no Salafists infiltrating” the
way there were “actual Communists” in the
American left of the 1940s. But then he fudges
the point by saying that “most of Henry
Wallace’s supporters were not Communists; they
simply considered communism a distraction from
the ‘real problem.’” Some of them maybe,
but we shouldn’t forget that some of them—and
not just members of the Communist
Party—believed the Soviet Union offered the
best dreams for humanity. MoveOn opposes current
U.S. foreign policy, but it harbors no illusions
about the emancipatory promise of the Taliban or
al Qaeda.
For all these reasons, the Taliban
and al Qaeda and the war on terror just can’t
ignite the sort of intellectual anxiety that the
communist regimes of the Cold War did. The Cold
War had a profound effect on American
intellectual and political life. Liberal
intellectuals were forced to look at themselves
and ask some troubling questions. They had to
reexamine their own popular-front past in the
1930s (and hence, some of their complicity with
the communism they were now fighting); they had
to scrutinize the legacy of “ideology” on the
American left (the famous “end of ideology”
thesis); they had to defend American liberal
democracy by rejuvenating political concepts like
civil society and pluralism. The Taliban and Qutb
cannot prompt any comparable collective
self-inspection by contemporary Western
intellectuals.
Finally, and perhaps
most embarrassingly, Beinart’s historical
analogy is misleading about the imperial ambition
and power of our new enemy. Not to put too fine a
point on it, but Mullah Omar is neither Hitler
nor Stalin. As Arendt wrote, totalitarian regimes
are bent on “world conquest.” Beinart admits
that radical Islam’s influence is shrinking
geographically. But he doesn’t think this point
through. During the Cold War, people looked at
the map, and it seemed that the Soviet Union
really was gobbling it up. And, just as
importantly, communism promised hope to alleviate
poverty in Africa and Asia. Today, by Beinart’s
own admission, Salafist ideology “directs no
governments and no armies” and lacks
“communism’s universalist appeal.” We need
to understand terrorism, but the category of
totalitarianism obscures more than it
illuminates.
The failure of historical
analogy to explain our current situation requires
us to ask a bigger question: was 9/11 as
transformative as some think? Should we see the
war on terror, as some did the war on communism,
as an axis around which to organize American
foreign policy? It is too early to be confident
that it is not. But there are some reasons for
doubt. Bush’s consistent attempt to see Iraq
through the lens of the war on terror provides
the most powerful case for caution. Toppling
Hussein’s dictatorship had nothing to do with
ending terrorism, and the blowback suggests why
we shouldn’t use the war on terror as a new
organizing principle for foreign policy (and why
we probably won’t in the near future). How
would our understanding of the situation in Iran
be improved by seeing it through the lens of the
war on terror? It’s hard to
imagine.
Should we conclude from the
failure of Beinart’s Cold War analogy that
there is nothing to the liberal-hawk arguments?
Not necessarily. You don’t need historical
analogies to justify a more robust liberal
foreign policy. You certainly don’t need
historical analogies to see terrorism as a threat
that needs to be fought aggressively. Nor do you
need them to justify intervening in the face of
humanitarian disaster or AIDS or poverty abroad.
It isn’t necessary to recall Truman’s
presidency to recognize the need for
multilateralism. Liberalism can oppose tyranny
abroad (even if it is not willing to exhaust all
resources fighting tyranny in every corner of the
world), especially if it is tempered by Reinhold
Niebuhr’s cautionary teachings (though our
historical moment is different from Niebuhr’s).
Indeed, the admission of error that frames
Beinart’s odd but refreshing introduction calls
to mind Niebuhr’s counsel that national
humility is a prerequisite for American action
abroad.
The anti-interventionist Left won’t
listen to Beinart and other liberal hawks, particularly after their
misjudgments about Iraq. But there is still some hope that liberal
hawks who have read their Niebuhr might offer the wider American
public something, especially if liberal hawks join the conversation
with reformed neoconservatives such as Francis Fukuyama, whose realistic
Wilsonianism also reflects some soul-searching about the limits
of military power and the need for international cooperation. There
might be an opening here for a new direction in American foreign
policy. Looking at the problems Iraq presently faces, the prospects
for such a middle ground seem inspirational. Even with all his faulty
analogies, Beinart is right to try to open up this sort of conversation
and infuse it with the Niebuhrian humility it demands. <
Kevin Mattson is a professor of history at Ohio University.
His most recent book is When America Was Great: The Fighting
Faith of Liberalism in Post-War America.
Originally published in the July/August 2006 issue of Boston Review
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