| Richman Replies
8 There
is a sad irony to the optimism in my account of how
state and local governments can inform and appropriately temper
the federal response to terrorism: it is based on
deep pessimism
about the threat of terrorism. Juliette Kayyem
suggests there
is no reason to believe that the kind of terrorist
threat we face
today is so pervasive in America that our entire
local and state
police apparatus must be complicit in the federal
governments
overarching enthusiasm. My assessment of the
available evidence
is quite different (though Id be thrilled to be wrong).
I assume there will be more attacks, and quite
possibly many more.
This is not an argument for blithely throwing money
at every project
touted as related to homeland security.
Nor for encouraging
every cop on the beat to see himself as deputized to wage his
own personal war on terror. But it does mean that
we need to develop a capability to prevent future
attacks.
Ms. Kayyem envisions the police
playing only two
roles in this endeavor for nowwaiting to be called in by the feds
when there is a credible threat, and when there isnt, serving as
conscientious objectors, critiqu[ing] and undermin[ing]. I
think this is the road to disaster. One of the most chilling aspects
of the 9/11 Commissions report was its account of the time the
hijackers spent in this country. The movement of people (even
reticent people) through any community leaves ripples. They rent
apartments, worship, and go to schools. The 9/11 hijackers did these
things for months, and those who tried to blow up the World Trade
Center and other New York landmarks in 1993 did it for longer, and
even conducted paramilitary training in rural Pennsylvania. As
Elizabeth Glazers pathbreaking violent gang work at the U.S.
Attorneys office in New York showed, the policethrough their
neighborhood contacts and felony arrestshave access to information
that the feds simply cannot duplicate, and that will be indispensable
in picking up these ripples and turning them into
leads. I
therefore think that Ms. Kayyem gravely underestimates the costs
leaving the police on the sidelines. Of course, one could argue that
these costs, however grave, should be charged against the federal
government because of its counterterrorism policies since 9/11. And
in response to Ms. Kayyems observations, and those of David Harris
and David Sklansky on this score, I simply cant offer a persuasive
defense of many of the federal governments activities over the
past three years. Perhaps someone else can. But that person would
need to come out with a far better case for the intelligence benefits
of the interview programs, detentions, and prosecutions of alleged
terrorism suspects on unrelated charges than the public record now
supports. Nor can I can really dispute Richard Fords suggestion
that the federal record so far does not inspire
optimism. The issue
becomes where we go from here. And on this my pessimism about the
threat inspires my optimism. No responsible police official wants to
be on the sidelines, and, at least over time, I expect the feds to be
more solicitous. Ultimately, I dont think the feds have a choice:
they need the cooperation, and they lack the money to buy it.
Constructive engagement is going to happen. I just want it to happen
now. Although the nexus between academic debate and actual
policymaking has been all too slight in recent years, my goals are
both to catalyze this engagement and to offer some assurance to those
who fear it. As Kevin Johnson
notes, one area where partnership
does not make sense, at least under current conditions, is in the
enforcement of the immigration laws. Yet at the same time there needs
to more-effective enforcement of these laws. The legacy of our
nations ambivalence about immigration policy has been a relatively
strict legal regime with extremely uneven enforcement. The INS was a
poor agency because too many interests were served by it being that
way. This has got to stop, and the job will be expensive. But
recruiting or dragooning the police to help may be a false economy,
with any savings in the federal budget outweighed by the costs in
criminal enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence gathering by
police. Far more thought needs to be given to this process than
either the administration or its legislative allies have been willing
to give. As for the FBI, I
completely agree with former Congressman
Barr that importation of the MI-5 model (a stand-alone domestic
intelligence agency) would both impair the collection of intelligence
by the FBI and create unnecessary risks of abuse. But, unlike him, I
do not think that we can avoid developing the kind of
intelligence-gathering and analysis capability that MI-5 provides.
That is precisely what we will need the FBI to do, and I support the
recent efforts of the Justice Department in this direction. When
former Congressman Barr contends that a law-enforcement model . .
. is likely to be empirically more effective and definitely less
prone to abuse than importing the foreign-intelligence model, he
is only half right. The law-enforcement model succeeded in putting a
bunch of terrorists away for a long time. And had any of the 9/11
hijackers survived, they could have been put away too. But the
torturous progress of the Moussaoui trial and the 9/11 Commissions
painful account of the pre-9/11 intelligence failures dramatically
illustrate the limits of this approach. As Elizabeth Glazer nicely
puts it, the sight lines need to be longer now. Former
Congressman Barr is right about the risks of abuse in this endeavor,
but we need to rise to the challenge of managing these
risks. Part
of the answer may lie in the accountability that long-term
interaction with state and local actors contributes to the domestic
intelligence system. Part will have to come through well-considered
regulation of federal intelligence collection. Take
librariesbastions of the First Amendment and personal autonomy,
but also places that provide easy access to computers that in turn
can access virtual terrorist bases. Libraries should be honored (and
well-funded) places. But prosecutors have sought information from
them in criminal cases in the past (e.g. when tracking the
Unabomber), and to put them out of range of agents tracking
terrorists makes little sense. Some balance between intelligence
needs and the risk of abusive data mining needs to be struck. But in
Washington, the debate has yet to advance beyond sound
bites. Edward Rubins
response plays to my prejudices. As a
lifelong resident of New York City, I admit that the notion of doing
away with states entirely has some appeal. And, as William Stuntz
notes, much would be gained were the federal government to play a far
more direct role in local policing than it has historically. But
given that we have not even been able to get the Department of
Homeland Security on its feet yet, tectonic changes of this magnitude
will have to wait. Moreover, the case against state involvement is
far weaker than it used to be. As in the days when the focus of
federal aid was on violent crime, too much homeland security money is
still sticking to state hands. But the emerging intelligence network
cannot simply be run from Washington, and we should not want it to
be. Some system of sub-national fusion will be needed, and the choice
is between regional centers run by Homeland Security or a state-based
system. Id much prefer the latter. Not only do states provide a
ready-made politically accountable platform to support the
architecture, but that platform is far more likely to take urban
concerns into account. At least so far, states have been rising to
this challenge, taking on an operational role that they rarely played
before. Maybe they just want to justify their cut of funding. For
now, though, we ought to give them the benefit of the
doubt. Unlike Rubin, Corey
Robin does not even think that
urban politics foster accountability (except in Dearborn). He is not
quite clear about the sources of the federal governments
accountability, however, and against a history in which purely
federal domestic intelligence programs have gone awry without any
state or local help, this is a serious lacuna. Moreover, in Robins
embrace of centralization, he misses the greatest contribution that
the federal government has made (at least in part) to better policing
at the local level: a focus on performance-oriented statistics. These
have probably done far more than civilian complaint review boards to
give police forces an interest in community relations. It is
enlightened self-interest, and not liberal principle, that lies
behind police officials reluctance to take on immigration
enforcement duties. But in structuring institutional arrangements,
enlightened self-interest is precisely what we should be looking
for.
Finally, a word on terminology.
Although this country has too often allowed epithets to drive
our policy, words do matter. I agree with Richard Ford that, at
least on the home front, talk of war is
not particularly
helpful. But, as Elizabeth Glazer suggests, Fords talk of
thugs and the cool professionalism of modern
law enforcement has its limits too. Dealing
with thugs
is fairly straightforward (and I enjoyed doing it): one gathers
evidence against them, seeks a criminal conviction by plea or
trial, and maybe even deters some potential thugs in
the process.
And if, in the interim, a thug does an extra bank job, or even
kills someone, we say, That is the price we pay
for a free
society. There is a grave social cost to dispensing with
this adjudicatory regime, but the cost of exclusive reliance on
it to protect ourselves may be even greater. We need
to work this
out. Ours is a history of both overreaction and underreaction
to threats. Well never get it precisely right.
But we need
to do better.<
Daniel Richman
is a professor at Fordham Law School and has written
extensively
about federal criminal enforcement issues. Between
1987 and 1992
he was a federal prosecutor in New York.
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Originally published in the December
2004/January 2005 issue of Boston Review |