At first reading, "Beyond the Civil Rights Industry" appears to be
a reasonable, if somewhat neo-conservative, analysis of the political
and strategic contradictions within the current generation of liberal
African American leadership elites. The article's rhetorical flourishes
and polemical thrusts reflect the grandiloquence of the African American
Church. Yet, when their rhetoric is peeled away, there remains a poverty
of constructive ideas. The authors' thesis is based on an erroneous
reading of black political history and sociology. Their real goal apparently
has less to do with persuading African Americans to question or challenge
their middle-class leadership elites, and more with impressing potential
investors on the political right who might underwrite their pet neighborhood
projects. In their political opportunism, they "out-Jesse" Jesse Jackson.
According to the weird political sociology of Thorne and Rivers, America
is divided into three castes: an almost monolithic white majority, the
black elite, and the nonwhite masses. The whites may be either compassionate
or cruel, but because they wield state power, it is in the long-term
interests of black people to negotiate with them. Thorne and Rivers
have a few complaints about the new Bush administration, but only because
90 percent of all African Americans believe that it is an illegitimate
regime. Even so, they dismiss the Congressional Black Caucus's decision
to walk out on the vote confirming Bush as president as a "symbol without
substance," forgetting that symbolic political acts—like sitting
in the whites-only section of a segregated public bus, or demanding
service at a Jim Crow lunch counter—always provided hope to the
oppressed while challenging their oppressors.
The authors imply that the black masses are stupid or foolish, because
they are so completely bamboozled by black elites. But Thorne and Rivers
save their true venom for African American leaders, who are repeatedly
denigrated as "aging bureaucrats," "cynical," completely "out of touch,"
and accused of having "largely abdicated their responsibility." Why
all the hostility? It may be entertaining for Boston Review's
core readers—upper-class but reasonably hip white liberals—to
be treated to an open struggle for prestige and power in the national
black community. This conflict is hardly new, though. The arguments
between traditional black clergy on one hand, and the new black professional-managerial
class and liberal officials on the other goes back 150 years.
The central social institution of the African American community has
always been, and remains to this day, the black church. Black faith-based
institutions led the resistance against slavery and Jim Crow segregation.
They actively sought to register black voters and to elect black public
officials. They initiated countless community renewal efforts around
issues such as neighborhood crime, homelessness, hunger, and unemployment.
Progressive black clergy have long believed that the divine is expressed
by practical engagement on behalf of the oppressed and by challenging
the institutional evils we see around us every day. The black church
fostered a public theology of resistance and renewal, and a practical
politics informed by morality.
But the black preacher was largely "created" by the black community's
marginalization from the mainstream. He was the only interlocutor between
the segregated worlds of white and black. His salary depended on his
fidelity to the concerns of black poor and working people, yet his effectiveness
rested on his ability to understand the art of the deal with the whites
in power. This faith-based elite dominated black politics after Reconstruction
for several generations.
During the Great Migration of blacks from the rural South to the urban
North, influential African-American ministers were frequently integrated
into conservative political machines. Municipal patronage and resources
were funneled through the black church hierarchy, in return for political
accommodation and racial subordination.
The first serious challengers to their hegemony were the liberal integrationists,
represented by "Talented Tenth" organizations such as the NAACP, the
Congress of Racial Equality, and the Urban League. The NAACP had grown
to 250,000 members by the end of World War II by employing education,
publicity, and litigation in the campaign to outlaw segregation. There
was, of course, a great overlap between these competing religious and
secular institutions of black civil society. Yet there was a crucial
difference between them. The black church was constructed in the context
of a rigidly segregated social order. Black professionals, school teachers,
auto mechanics, and the unemployed frequently worshiped side by side.
The NAACP's moderate leaders, like Walter White, or more liberal integrationist
activists, such as Bayard Rustin, sought to build a world without racial
distinctions, where the ghetto would cease to exist. In that integrated
world, the power of the black church would be undermined: as other institutions
opened themselves up to African Americans, the church would lose its
exclusive place in black communities and black ministers would lose
their special place as leaders and intermediaries.
Since the civil rights movement, a myth has been constructed that the
black ministers were central actors in the desegregation struggle. This
was frequently the case, but not always, or under all conditions. The
majority of black Baptist leaders opposed direct involvement in sit-ins
and freedom rides and forced Martin Luther King Jr. and eight hundred
other clergymen to create the breakaway Progressive Baptist Convention
in 1961. And so the legislative and legal triumphs of liberal integrationism—represented
by the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act in 1965, as well as the implementation of affirmative action—set
the stage for a new African American leadership elite, the black elected
officials. Black elected officials numbered barely one hundred in 1964,
1,100 by 1970, 3,500 by 1983, and over ten thousand by 1995. The power
of black elected officials, like that of black ministers, was a byproduct
of racially segregated residential patterns. It was no accident that
the first African American elected to Congress after the Reconstruction,
Oscar De Priest, represented America's most racially segregated city,
Chicago. Unlike their faith-based brethren, the politicians sought to
leverage the state from within. As their numbers grew, the relative
power of the African American clergy declined in significance.
When the political spectrum shifted sharply to the right in the aftermath
of the Reagan and Gingrich revolutions, however, the black church was
pushed back onto the political playing field. While neoliberal economic
policies, governmental devolution, and welfare reform spelled social
devastation to the black liberal political establishment, many in the
African American church saw fresh opportunities for new initiatives—all
of which brings us to the current debate. To Thorne and Rivers, the
vast problems of the criminal justice system conjure up strategies for
a "tough love approach" that churches have traditionally supported—instead
of sensible, if radical, solutions, such as a national moratorium on
new prison construction, the restoration of full voting rights for 4.3
million ex-felons, and the outlawing of draconian mandatory minimum
sentencing for drug offenders. Likewise, Thorne and Rivers see the AIDS
epidemic as an opportunity for moral leadership from church leaders
in the United States—not as a part of the vast social crisis that
has been accelerated by globalization and corporate trade policy.
The challenge for the black left, however, is that faith-based institutions
still perform much of the "heavy lifting" inside the African-American
community. We have to find a greater place in our political practice
for mobilizing and working cooperatively with religious institutions
and their leaders. Yet, the thorny dilemma for black churches still
remains: community service providers that have a growing dependence
on the federal government will probably disengage from militant social
protest movements of the sort that brought down Jim Crow and are needed
to improve the condition of all black Americans today. The real challenge
for the black freedom movement is to engage capacity building at grassroots
levels, creating a new kind of leadership not from the top down, but
the bottom up. •
Manning Marable is professor of history and political science
and director of the Institute for Research in African-American Studies
at Columbia University.
Return to the forum on faith
in politics, with Eva Thorne, Eugene Rivers, and responses.