Whats Fair?
A response to "The
Future of Affirmative Action" by Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier.
Peter Cappelli
Arguments about affirmative action have often been based
on misinformation about how applicants are selected in the "real"
world. Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier are doing important work in developing
an argument for affirmative action that is based on more accurate information
about how selection works. Their argument focuses on the selection decisions
used in hiring, in admissions to education, and in promotions, and it
begins by challenging the implicit assumption that those who are selecting
applicants know what they are doing.
It is certainly reasonable to argue that organizations
have a right to select the best and most capable applicants. But in
many cases, they make no rigorous attempt to do so. Most organizations
(including university faculties) make hiring decisions based on unstructured
interviews, despite the documented fact that interviews are about the
worst method for determining which candidates will make good employees.
Perceptions of applicant ability based on the typical method of unstructured
interviews have roughly zero correlation with subsequent performance
in jobs. Many employers appear to have no systematic arrangements for
selecting among applicants.
What may be more surprising is that even systematic attempts
to determine who will be a good employee or a successful student are
far from accurate. Selection tests and college admission tests are limited
to predicting performance in first jobs and first-semester grade point
averages, respectively. Even the very best of these tests correlate
at levels less than 50 percent with actual performance and most predict
far less (even 50 percent correlational relationships translate into
predicting only 25 percent of the variance in performance). If employers
or higher education institutions cannot tell which applicants are going
to be good, then the common objection to affirmative actionthat
giving preference in admissions or hiring to members of a protected
group will in some way hurt the organization by excluding better applicantsis
substantially weakened.
The strongest argument
against this common objection to affirmative action comes from empirical
results about what affirmative action actually does in practice. A recent
and important survey of this literature by Harry Holzer and David Neumark
reaches several noteworthy conclusions.1
First, affirmative action seems to work in the sense that it promotes
distributive justicethat is, it increases employment or participation
among women and minorities in the organizations that use it. Second,
employers who engage in affirmative action seem to recruit and select
more carefullythat is, they look more broadly for applicants and
evaluate them against more criteria. Finally, and most importantly,
these employers do not appear to pay any price in terms of employee
performance for engaging in affirmative action. In fact, the job performance
of women and minorities hired by these employers is, if anything, higher
than that of white males. Despite the fact that the credentials on characteristics
like education are lower for the women and minority employees of firms
that pursue affirmative action, their employers seem to have uncovered
other attributes about them, through more careful recruiting, that are
associated with better job performance.
The argument that affirmative action is at a minimum no
worse than the alternative from the perspective of employers seems on
solid ground. If the methods that employers are using now have an adverse
impact on protected groups, as Sturm and Guinier assert, and employers
are not getting much from those methods, then the argument for affirmative
action, which has the considerable advantage of enhancing distributive
justice, is very powerful.
But what if the
alternative here is not typical recruitment and selection practices?
What if employers got more sophisticated and adopted the best selection
procedures? Many of the best selection tests in terms of predictive
power, such as cognitive ability tests, also seem to be ones that have
the most adverse impact. Sturm and Guinier have a point in arguing that
many paper-and-pencil tests seem to discriminate against minorities
in particular. A recent study of higher education admissions and test
scores confirms this point in showing that blacks score disproportionately
lower on SAT tests than on other indicators of college performance,
such as high school grades.2
The same may be true for employment selection tests. Here they offer
a sensible alternative: if other practices, perhaps in combination,
can achieve the same level of predictive power while avoiding adverse
impact, then those other practices should be preferred.
Their other recommendations may be harder to swallow,
at least for most employers, because they do not seem to be based on
how most employers operate. For example, it is no doubt true that some
individuals may be able to perform jobs well in ways other than recruiters
and employment-test designers envision. But it is also difficult to
ask organizations to let people who do not appear to be qualified try
out jobs to see if they can succeed at them in different ways. The costs
of failure for most jobs are big, not only the turnover costs if someone
does not work out but also the potential costs of accidents and mistakes.
The law also makes employers liable for hiring unqualified employees,
for example, who cause accidents, if the employers did not take reasonable
steps to screen them. Arrangements where otherwise unqualified applicants
are hired and then trained and developed to handle jobs are a great
idea for expanding opportunity, but are also a significant operating
expense that not all employers are equipped to bear, especially in a
just-in-time economy. Nor is there any reason to think that team-based,
self-managed work systems will result in less discrimination. If employers
discriminate, despite economic incentives to hire the best people and
human resource departments trained to do otherwise, then there is no
reason to think that individual employees will behave better. And while
it is true that there are some advantages to a diverse workforce from
the perspective of performance, there are also costs, and it is not
obvious that the net effect is such that it will necessarily encourage
decision-makers to act in the interests of diversity.
It is worth bearing in mind that predicting who is going
to be a good employee or a successful student or a good citizen is an
enormously complicated exercise. It is difficult to do even after the
fact, as anyone who has ever struggled with writing a performance appraisal
can attest. There are other issues associated with hiring employees
and admitting college students in addition to predicting who will succeed,
of course, and these concern the issue of who gets ahead in society.
As Sturm and Guinier make clear, it is much easier to argue for affirmative
action to advance distributive justice if it does not conflict with
the right of employers or other institutions to select individuals that
serve the institutions purpose. And more valid arrangements that also
advance affirmative action would be highly desirable.
It does still leave
us, however, with a vexing problem of procedural justice, the right
of applicants to be treated fairly. The standardized tests and civil
service exams that Sturm and Guinier rightly criticize on validity grounds
at least have the advantage of being objective and consistent for the
applicants, if not necessarily valid from the perspective of the institutions
administering them. Applications for sought-after and politically sensitive
positions like civil service jobs or state university admissions are
based on objective tests precisely to quell the procedural justice complaintsand
lawsuitsthat such decisions otherwise raise. A more diverse set
of selection criteria that allow applicants to demonstrate competencies
in different ways has the disadvantage of making the process appear
less objective. One might well prefer a system that advances diversity
while producing competent individuals to one that does neither but seems
fair to the applicants, but it would obviously be best to achieve all
three goals.
Peter Cappelli
is director of Center
for Human Resources at the University of Pennsylvanias Wharton
School.
New Democracy Forum: Click here
to read other responses to "The Future of Affirmative Action," by Susan
Sturm and Lani Guinier.
1 Harry Holzer and David Neumark, "Assessing Affirmative
Action," Journal of Economic Literature 38 (2000): 483-595.
2 William T. Dickens and Thomas J. Kane, "Racial Test
Score Differences as Evidence of Reverse Discrimination: Less Than Meets
the Eye," Industrial Relations 38 (1999): 331-363.