The Authors Reply
The respondents to our essay share our goal: a political system "of, by,
and for the people." We all agree, too, that fundamental changes will be needed
to achieve this goal, that working together is important, and that reform
will take patience and steadfastness in the face of tremendous opposition,
to paraphrase Senator Russell Feingold.
It is clear, however, that we have substantial differences on how best to
reform the political system. We have absolutely no intention of claiming that
the Clean Money Option alone will bring us there. Indeed it is, as our respondents
suggest, only one of a series of steps to restore vitality to our democratic
process. But two of the routes to reform suggested in the replies are, as
we see it, not worth taking. One would require that the Supreme Court change
its mind about Buckley, or that the Constitution be amended. The second
is partial reform, which would lead us somewhere, but not necessarily to where
we want to go. We consider these in turn, and then discuss some of the criticisms
of the Clean Money Option itself.
1. Because there's little short-term hope of overturning Buckley,
effective reform requires that we work within its confines. So that rules
out many otherwise worthy proposals. In particular, as Josh Rosencranz argues,
the courts are looking less favorably on restrictions (contribution limits)
than on subsidies (providing voluntary public financing). Low contribution
limits, as urged by Doug Phelps and passed by Arkansas voters, have been thrown
out by courts in Missouri, the District of Columbia, and Oregon. Similarly,
Bruce Ackerman's Patriot program--if it includes the provision that "only
red-white-and-blue money could be legally used to finance political campaigns"--would
also need constitutional modification or reinterpretation. Some provisions
of McCain-Feingold--in-district funding requirements and bans on PACs--are
also constitutionally suspect. We must do more than write our victories in
the sand. (Here, we must simply disagree with Phelps' assertion that the Clean
Money Option itself will require a constitutional amendment or overthrow of
Buckley. A recent 8th Circuit decision, in Rosensteil v. Rodriguez,
is promising on this score.)
As to a constitutional amendment limiting campaign spending: while we agree
in principle, we just don't think it is a practical strategy. What we hope,
however, is that if organizations like US PIRG pursue it, they will not exclude
other strategies. Even with a constitutional change, we would still need to
enact meaningful reform addressing the source of campaign money. It is this
process--the state-by-state efforts and passage of federal reform--that will
set the stage for the day that the Buckley decision is relegated to
history.
2. Just because the road has some constitutional obstacles doesn't mean that
reformers should settle for partial measures. As John Stuart Mill said, "Against
a great evil a small remedy does not produce a small result, it produces no
result at all." The proposals outlined by several of the respondents deal
inadequately with the most direct and corrosive aspect of our political system--the
special interest financing of our elected officials. That is what the Clean
Money Option addresses, and it does so simply. Additional provisions, like
Senator Feingold's soft money and independent expenditure proposals are essential,
and would be included in any federal Clean Money bill.
3. Apart from proposing alternative reform strategies, the respondents raise
some questions about the Clean Money proposal itself. Zach Polett observes
that we don't want systems that strengthen the power of politicians while
weakening organized groups of voters. We couldn't agree more. By requiring
the collection of a large number of small contributions to qualify for public
funding, the Clean Money Option would create a system in which grassroots
organizations of all types, as well as political parties, could be at the
center. Money shouldn't be the only vehicle for accountability, though. Steve
Rosenthal and Amanda Fuchs understand this as well, and we appreciate their
willingness to support proposals along the lines of Maine's initiative.
Thomas Mann raises similar questions, and adds to them the need to address
independent expenditures. We agree that there is such a need: While the Maine
law doubles the public money given to complying candidates in response to
this type of spending, the federal proposal caps that at a fivefold increase.
What are the implications of this for the problem of costs raised by Daniel
Lowenstein? Clean Money federal elections will cost the average taxpayer less
a movie ticket and bag of popcorn per year. And certainly today's underfunded
challengers will fare better in a Clean Money framework.
Lowenstein also asks about party-strengthening measures: we are all for them.
The soft-money drug isn't strengthening our major parties. It has turned them
into corporate money junkies, looking for the next fix of $100,000. That's
why we wholeheartedly agree with Senator Feingold's soft money provision,
and would support it as a stand-alone provision . . . in a heartbeat.
As for James Madison: According to Lowenstein's reading, American democracy
is supposed to be a collision of private and public interests. We prefer to
listen to Madison when he directly addresses the central role of money in
politics: "Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not
the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names more than the humble sons [and daughters]
of obscure and unpropitious fortune."